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1 Anne-Marie  Brady,  Marketing  Dictatorship:  Propaganda  and  Thought  Work  in
Contemporary China, Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 2008, 232 pp. 
2 In Marketing Dictatorship, Anne-Marie Brady explores the role of political propaganda
and thought work in post-1989 China, which she claims “have become the very life
blood […] of the Party-State” (p. 1). Although those tools were also crucial for shaping
public opinion and protecting the state’s image under Mao, the author argues that the
CCP  “has  transformed  itself  from  a  revolutionary  party  holding  power  by  right  of
ideology to that of a political party in power (zhizheng dang)” (p. 2). Underlying the
latter is a logic aiming at ensuring the CCP’s ongoing legitimacy to rule, with greater
emphasis on persuasion than repression. Mindful of the lessons of the Soviet Union, the
Chinese leadership realised that force could only constitute a short-term solution, and
that long-term control required a “methodology of mass persuasion” (p. 71). As such,
China’s leaders have used Western mass communications theory to master the methods
of  “engineering consent” (p.  3).  While  they’ve exploited the benefits  of  PR and the
Internet, they've also developed software, introduced filters, and relied upon a well-
informed  police  force  to  manage  the  “side  effects”  of  information  communication
technologies (p. 145). Brady contrasts these modern propaganda strategies with those
prevalent under Mao, including mass organisations (qunzhong zuzhi). 
3 Furthermore,  the  content  of  public  discourse  between  those  two  eras  differs
significantly. While downplaying Marxism-Leninism, some of the key themes that the
central  government  has  stressed  in  the  past  20  years  are  economic  liberalism,
nationalism, and “selective anti-foreignism” (p. 3). Economic liberalism meant greater
press freedom as far as reporting economy-related news was concerned. Nationalism
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was accompanied by the spread of  patriotic  education sites  such as  memorials  and
museums (p. 50), as well as pressure on journalists to publicly stress that Taiwan is a
province  of  China  (p.  103).  Similarly,  news  about  ethno-nationalist  mobilisation  in
other parts of the world was censored for fear of inciting local ethno-nationalist groups
to  challenge  efforts  aimed  at  consolidating  a  Chinese  national  identity  (p.  52).
“Selective anti-foreignism” took the form of explicit critiques of the system of mass
persuasion  in  modern  democratic  societies  (e.g.,  Noam  Chomsky’s  books  became
references in China’s schools of journalism), and censorship of foreign information that
could  compromise  the  country’s  image.  The  Central  Propaganda  Department
established simple norms and objectives for public discourse: “think positive” (p. 95),
“no bad news during holiday periods or sensitive dates” (p. 96), avoid raising problems
that are hard to solve, speak of the economy, “demonize the United States” (p. 98),
refrain  from  “promot[ing]  the  views  of  the  enemy”  (p.  99),  and  selectively  report
international news. 
4 Brady’s  book  is  groundbreaking  in  two  ways.  First,  it  provides  a  comprehensive
institutional account of the inner workings of the propaganda system. It explains who
is  responsible  for  censoring  what,  and  how  organisations  relate  to  each  other.
Additionally, it sheds light on who in that system gained or lost influence after 1989.
For instance, while “the Propaganda Department of the General Political Office of the
PLA ha[d] a history of making independent decisions in propaganda matters” (p. 26),
since the 1990s, some important PLA figures have been punished for deviating from the
Central Propaganda Department’s line (p. 27). 
5 Second,  Brady’s  book helps  fill  an important  gap in  the  literature  on ideology and
propaganda  in  China  by  situating  the  leadership’s  censorship  methods  within  the
context of thought work strategies in other non-democratic and democratic societies.
For  instance, Brady  emphasises  that  the  party-state  has  drawn  lessons  from  the
propaganda mistakes of  the Soviet  Union.  In the eyes of  Beijing,  Gorbachev’s  move
from glasnost in 1985 to an attempt to re-impose media censorship in 1991 was a recipe
for disaster. Similarly, Chinese think tanks have analysed the rise and fall of long-term
one-party states in countries such as Mexico, Japan, and Singapore (p. 182), and the
potential role of propaganda in the latter. Finally, among other examples, the CCP has
learned from the success  of  the United States  in ensuring “patriotic  education and
respect for the flag” (p. 180), and has sought to apply similar methods for those same
purposes. 
6 Despite  its  significant  contributions,  the  book  has  three  weaknesses.  First,  beyond
specific examples of topics or events that were completely banned for public discussion
(e.g., the outbreak of SARS in 2003) or promoted by the CCP (e.g., the US bombing of
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999),  there is no specific framework analysing the
reasons for variance in the content of propaganda. Why are some matters constructed
as threatening to the image of the CCP, and others not? How are the boundaries drawn
between problems that can be openly discussed and those that cannot be?
7 Second,  while  Brady suggests  that  propaganda has played a major role  in ensuring
regime resilience in post-1989 China, the author does not articulate the mechanisms
linking effective propaganda and the continuity of CCP rule. More precisely, Brady’s
analysis  offers  no  systematic  explanation of  the  impact  of  thought  work on public
minds.  Doing so would have required moving away from an exclusive focus on the
propaganda system as the unit of analysis, and tracing the mechanisms through which
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formal institutions mould ideas, norms, and opinions within society, and/or the ways
in which society reacts to institutions. The reader is thus left thinking that Brady is
inferring the effectiveness of propaganda based on the institutional coherence of its
apparatus. Existent studies suggest that the latter does not have a uniform effect on
public minds, as implicitly suggested in Brady’s analysis. Béja provides an interesting
account of the loopholes and contradictions in the propaganda system. He emphasises
that  a  number  of  intellectuals,  including  Ding  Dong  and  Li  Hui,  have  developed
alternative interpretations of the history of the People’s Republic that are sold today by
official publishers in China.1 In a similar vein, Pils (2007) stresses that in recent years,
many  mainland  lawyers  have  dedicated  their  work  to  the  defence  of  legal  rights
(weiquan)  and  to  the  rectification  of  historical  injustices,2 hence  challenging  the
authorities’ own conception of rights and interpretation of history. 
8 A potential way to address the effects of the propaganda system on public minds more
explicitly could have been to pay closer attention to the significant role of education as
a vehicle for thought work. The author unfortunately obscures much of this.
9 Finally, Brady could have situated the “propaganda” factor in the broader context of
academic  debates  about  the  causes  of  autocratic  regime  resilience,  in  China  and
elsewhere. To what extent is propaganda more important than other factors stressed in
the regime literature? How can it complement existent studies?
10 Anne-Marie  Brady’s  Marketing  Dictatorship  nonetheless  remains  a  significant
contribution that speaks to a wide range of studies, including those on Chinese
nationalism  and  autocratic  resilience.  As  yet,  it  is  the  first  attempt  to  provide  a
comprehensive account of the institutional complexity of the propaganda apparatus in
post-1989 mainland China.
1 Jean-Philippe Béja,  “Forbidden Memory, Unwritten History: The Difficulty of Structuring an
Opposition  Movement  in  the  PRC,”  China  Perspectives,  No.  4,  2007,  p.  98.  2 Eva  Pils,  “The
Persistent  Memory of  Historic  Wrongs  in  China:  A  Discussion of  Demands for  ‘Reappraisal,’”
China Perspectives, No. 4, 2007, p. 99.
NOTES
1 Jean-Philippe Béja,  “Forbidden Memory, Unwritten History: The Difficulty of Structuring an
Opposition Movement in the PRC,” China Perspectives, No. 4, 2007, p. 98. 2 Eva Pils, “The
Persistent  Memory of  Historic  Wrongs  in  China:  A  Discussion of  Demands for  ‘Reappraisal,’”
China Perspectives, No. 4, 2007, p. 99.
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